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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L. ROBISON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
1 ' • i 
Case No. 20050257-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
* * * 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the St^te submits 
this brief in reply to the new matters raised in respondent's brief. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I 
THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR IN DEFENDANT'S GUILTY 
PLEA 
Defendant asserts that plain error is a proper basis for a court to reverse a 
guilty plea on an issue that is both unpreserved and unbriefed. Br. Resp. at 10-11 
He also argues that the court of appeals correctly reversed his guilty plea for plain 
error. Br. Resp. at 11-15. 
Pages 12-22 of the State's Brief of Petitioner adequately respond to 
defendant's claim that courts may reach an unpreserved and unbriefed issue to 
avert plain error. The State therefore makes no reply to that argument. The State's 
brief also adequately responds to defendant's claim that error occurred and that the 
error was obvious. 
Defendant's claim that the court correctly found plain error, however, 
misstates the standard for plain error in a guilty plea. He asserts throughout his 
brief that plain error occurred because the district court did not strictly comply with 
rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Br. Pet. at 11-15. But a rule 11 violation 
by itself, even an obvious one, does not constitute plain error. Plain error requires 
an error that is both obvious and harmful. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,115, 95 
P.3d 276. Harm arises from a rule 11 violation only if the defendant demonstrates 
that "'but for' the alleged error, he or she would not have pled guilty." Id. at \ 22 
(quoting State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, \ 17,26 P.3d 203). 
Here, defendant claims only that there was a defect in the rule 11 colloquy. 
See Br. Resp. at 12. This is insufficient. He must show that, but for the district 
court's alleged error, he would not have pled guilty. 
The court of appeals also erred in this regard. It reversed defendant's plea for 
plain error because it determined that his plea did not "contain an admission to all 
the elements of the offense." State v. Robison, 2004 UT App 9, page 2 (unpublished 
memorandum decision). But error alone is insufficient. Harm sufficient to 
constitute plain error occurs only if defendant would have refused to plead guilty 
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had his plea contained an admission to all the elements of the offense. $ee Dean, 
2004 UT 63, \ 15. As explained on pages 25-26 of the States Brief of Petitioner, 
defendant was well aware of the facts and elements of the offense, and he would not 
have refused to plead guilty even with a more thorough articulation of those facts 
and elements at the plea hearing. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS POINT II 
I. INDUCEMENT OR FRAUDULENT INTENT IS NOT AN 
ELEMENT OF THE BAD CHECK STATUTE 
Defendant asserts that to violate the bad check statute a person must "commit 
fraud by using the check as a tool or as an inducement to convince another person to 
transfer property/' Br. Resp. at 15-16. This is incorrect. The bad check statute does 
not require any fraudulent intent. To the contrary, the legislature removed the 
element of fraudulent intent in a 1973 amendment to the statute. Compare 1969 Utah 
Laws ch. 239 § 1 with 1973 Utah Laws ch. 196 § 76-6-505. All the present statute 
requires is that the check issue "for the purpose of obtaining . . . any money, 
property or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rent." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004). A person may thus violate the 
bad check statute by innocently a writing bad check and then failing to make good 
on the check within fourteen days of notice that the check was dishonored. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2). 
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Thus, a defendant's check need not induce the victim to part with any value. 
It need only issue "for the purpose of obtaining" anything of value from the victim. 
A defendant might issue a check for such a purpose after he has already obtained 
the value, for part of obtaining value is paying for it. 
The statute, in fact, contemplates that the bad check might issue after the 
value is received. It prohibits not just checks written for goods or other tangible 
value, it also includes bad checks issued to pay for services, wages, salary, or labor. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (West 2004). As a practical matter, payment for 
services, wages, salary, or labor often occurs after, sometimes well after, the service 
is performed. Construing Utah's bad check statute to require the check itself to 
induce the laborer to perform his services would exclude most checks written for 
payment of services from the ambit of the statute. 
II. CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS DOES NOT 
SUPPORT GRAFTING A CONTEMPORANEOUS EXCHANGE 
ELEMENT ONTO UTAH'S BAD CHECK STATUTE 
Defendant asserts that a contemporaneous exchange is a dispositive element 
of the bad check statute. See Br. Resp. at 17; State v. Robison, 2004 UT App 9, page 2 
(unpublished memorandum decision). He cites to four jurisdictions that he claims 
have adopted a contemporaneous exchange rule for their bad check statutes: 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Illinois, and Maryland. The State noted three other 
jurisdictions in its Brief of Petitioner: Georgia, Iowa, and New Mexico. Although a 
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few states that have adopted a contemporaneous exchange rule, case law from these 
and other jurisdictions provides little support for grafting such a rule onto Utah's 
bad check statute. 
Bad check statutes come in all shapes and sizes. Many require neither 
fraudulent intent nor the obtaining of value. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 45-6-316 
(West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.). Such statutes require only that the defendant 
issue a check that he or she knows will not be honored by the bank. Others require 
either fraudulent intent or that the defendant obtain or seek to obtain a thing of 
value. See, e.g., Ala. Code. § 13A-9-13.1 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); Cal. 
Penal Code § 476a (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
205.130 (West, Westlaw through 2004 Sess.). 
Of those states that have grafted a contemporaneous exchange requirement 
onto their bad check statute, all require either fraudulent intent in their statue or 
they have an express exchange requirement in the statute. For example, as 
explained on pages 28-29 of the State's Brief of Petitioner, cases in Georgia, Iowa, 
and New Mexico have required a contemporaneous exchange. But their statutes 
expressly require the check to issue in "exchange" for something of value. See Ga. 
Code Ann. § 16-9-20 (West, Westlaw through 2004 Sess.); Iowa Code Ann. § 714.1 
(West, Westlaw through 2005 update); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-36-4 (West, Westlaw 
through 2004 Sess.). 
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Likewise, State v. McLean, 44 So.2d 698, 674 (La. 1950), cited by defendant, 
adopted a contemporaneous exchange rule. Br. Resp. at 18. But, like the statutes in 
Georgia, Iowa, and New Mexico, Louisiana's statute only applies where the check is 
given "in exchange for anything of value" See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:71 (West, 
Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); McLean, 44 So.2d at 674. 
Language in a statute requiring that the check be given "in exchange for a 
thing of value," suggests a contemporaneous exchange in which the check is the 
inducement for the transfer. Thus, the court in McLean, held that "the crime 
denounced is committed only when there is a concurrence in point of time of an 
intent to defraud, the receipt of title and possession of a thing of value, and the 
giving of the worthless check in payment therefore." McLean, 44 So.2d at 674. 
Notably, since McLean, Louisiana has amended its statute to apply "whether the 
exchange is contemporaneous or not." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:71(A)(l)(a). 
Defendant also cites to cases in Illinois, Mississippi, and Maryland to support 
his claim for a contemporaneous transaction rule. Br. Resp. at 18-19. The statutes of 
two of those states, Illinois and Mississippi, expressly require the state to prove 
intent to defraud. See 720 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/17-1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 
934087 of the 2004 Sess.); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-19-55 (West, Westlaw through 2005 
Sess.). Maryland's bad check statute does not expressly require an intent to defraud. 
See Md. Code, Crim. Law, § 8-103 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.). But its 
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highest court has interpreted the history and language of the statute as requiring 
that the victim rely upon the check in transferring goods to the defendant. See State 
v. Sinclair, 337 A.2d 703, 707 (Md. 1975). 
Like an express exchange requirement, a requirement of intent to defraud or 
reliance on the check strongly suggests the need for a contemporaneous exchange. 
Fraud, by definition, is a "knowing misrepresentation of the truth" to "induce 
another to act to his or her detriment." Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999). 
Where a bad check statute requires fraudulent intent or reliance, the check must 
induce the seller to part with his or her goods. In such circumstances a non-
contemporaneous exchange suggests that the seller did not rely on the check to 
transfer goods to the buyer. 
Two states have rejected this reasoning, however, and have rejected a 
contemporaneous exchange rule. See Rice v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d 911,914 (Ky. 
1981); State v. Hedrick, 636 N.E.2d 428,432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). Both the Kentucky 
and the Ohio bad check statutes require intent to defraud. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
514.040 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2913.11 (West, 
Westlaw through 2005 Sess.). However, the courts in those states look to the intent 
at the time the value is obtained, not when the check issues. They conclude that the 
intent and the harm is the same whether the check is exchanged contemporaneously 
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with the value or at a later date. See Rice, 621 S.w.2d at 914; Hendrick, 636 N.E.2d at 
432. 
The disparity between the language and the elements of Utah's bad check 
statute those of other states makes case law from those states unhelpful in 
determining the Utah legislature's intent. Instead, this Court should rely, as the 
State argues in its brief of Petitioner, on the plain text of Utah's bad check statute. 
III. IN ANY EVENT, THE EXCHANGE WAS CONTEMPORANEOUS 
Even if a contemporaneous exchange were a required element of the bad 
check statute, that element was met in this case. Although defendant had 
possession of the truck when he issued the two bad checks, he did not have the title. 
The victim did not send defendant the title until defendant issued the second bad 
check (R. 396:18-19). The title certainly had value to both defendant and the victim, 
as it represented proof of ownership of the truck. Thus there was an adequate 
factual basis for defendant's plea because his second bad check passed in a 
contemporaneous exchange with the title, a thing of value. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State 
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted December 30,2005. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D.BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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